CO129-486 - Public Offices - 1924 — Page 259

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meroly for the plonsure of admitting a competitor whose country has decided to manufacture morphing, for instance, for its own woede end for a part of the extoinea market. The alternative will be that the manufacturers in po.session of the markets will reface to edit this hypothesis or this reality, when it takes place. Ich country having, by definition, the right to manu- facture for its own noods, and, once more, for a certain part to be exported, will be afraid, if it signs a convention, of being exposed to the discussion of the limitations of its right

ith which it is when the time comes, and to conditions uneoquainted by a consortium of heati possidenteg with full

information and well equipped.

The syston of direct limitation appearing to be coufrort ed with obstacles which are practically insurmountable, can thero be realised an indirect lipitation by a very strictly a gani sed national and international control? The whole purpose of this

note is to examine this possibility.

If a system can be organised by which each country will

only be able to receive in fuot what it requiros for its legitimate medical needs and to export to any other country what this country really requires for its own legitimate medical needs (which it must know bettor then anyone else, but which ney vary), it seems that the optimu vill be rozliced. The practical consequenoo would be a limitation, size it is absolutely certain that the actual production of raw stuffs end of manufactured drugs is greatly in excess of legitimate requiremente; and thie limitation would not result from an apportionment on an uncertain basis and a necessarily arbitrary one, but from the working itself of a system which it would be vory difficult for anyone to refuse to accept, because it will respect the sovereignty and liberty of each country in the full

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